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ABSTRACT
The recent surge in blockchain applications and database systems
has renewed the interest in traditional Byzantine Fault Tolerant
consensus protocols (BFT). Several such BFT protocols follow a
primary-backup design, in which a primary replica coordinates the
consensus protocol. In primary-backup designs, the normal-case
operations are rather simple. At the same time, primary-backup
designs place an unreasonable burden on primaries and allows mali-
cious primaries to affect the system throughput substantially, how-
ever. To resolve this situation, we propose theMultiBFT paradigm,
a protocol-agnostic approach towards improving the performance
of primary-backup consensus protocols. At the core of MultiBFT
is an approach to continuously order the client-transactions by run-
ning several instances of the underlying BFT protocol in parallel.
We bring forth our paradigm to two well-established BFT protocols
and demonstrate that the rendered parallelized protocols are not
only safe and live but also significantly outperform, up to 2×, their
original non-parallelized forms. Further, we show that ourMulti-
BFT paradigm reaches a throughput of up to 320K transactions per
second.
1 INTRODUCTION
The recent surge in blockchain technology has led to the design
of several blockchain database systems (henceforth referred to as
BDBs) [3, 24, 25, 49]. These BDBs employ a Byzantine-Fault Toler-
ant consensus protocol (BFT) to make a traditional database fault-
tolerant [10, 53, 67]. Given a set of replicas and a client transaction,
a BFT protocol helps to reach an agreement on the order for that
client transaction among all the correct replicas, even if some of the
replicas are byzantine.
Although these fault-tolerant BDBs are safe, their throughput
is much less (of the order 10K txns/s) than state-of-the-art data-
base systems, which can easily achieve throughputs of the order
100K txns/s [28, 29]. The key reason for these BDBs attaining low
throughput is their dependence on a single replica designated as
the primary. Existing database systems, on the other hand, allow
all of their replicas to serve the clients and employ a concurrency
control protocol to ensure a single state across all the replicas [28].
This single-primary design is expensive for the primary, as it
not only receives all the client transactions, but also has to ensure
that a consensus on the order for these transactions is reached
among all the other replicas (backups). Consequently, the primary
has a higher load than the other replicas and acts as a bottleneck in
the overall system throughput. Further, a byzantine primary can
tactically derail the system throughput, and such an attack may not
always be detected. If a primary is detected as byzantine, then these
protocols require primary replacement. This replacement process,
which helps to guarantee liveness, causes performance degradation
as consensus needs to be repeated on all the requests since the last
stable state.
In this paper, we learn from the existing database systems and en-
vision the design of a blockchain database system, ResilientDB,1
that allows several of its replicas to act as primaries. To ensure
this, we introduce a protocol-agnostic, Multiple Byzantine Fault-
Tolerance paradigm (referred to as MultiBFT). MultiBFT takes as
input an existing primary-backup BFT consensus protocol and re-
quires each replica to runmultiple instances of the protocol in paral-
lel. Further, to improve load-balancing,MultiBFT ensures that each
instance is managed by a distinct primary replica. Each primary
receives a client transaction and leads the consensus on this transac-
tion. After all instances at a replica have reached consensus on their
transactions, these transactions are executed at the replica in a de-
terministic order (which is the same across all replicas). The parallel
instances not only help MultiBFT to achieve higher throughput
but also help in monitoring malicious primary attacks. Moreover,
our MultiBFT paradigm helps to yield continuous-ordering BFT
protocols that always order a subset of client requests.
The key challenge for MultiBFT is to thwart collusion attacks
by multiple malicious primaries. Such a critical attack can ensure
that none of the good replicas make any progress. Although some
prior works [4, 64] have presented BFT protocols that employ mul-
tiple primaries, these works neither acknowledge collusion attacks,
nor present efficient recovery from such attacks. Further, these
protocols attain negligible throughputs until the system has fully
recovered. We show that our MultiBFT paradigm not only detects
and defends against such attacks but also maintains high through-
put, while assuring that ResilientDB maintains safety.
In specific, we make the following key contributions:
(1) We present our protocol-agnosticMultiBFT paradigm that
supports efficient parallelization of a BFT protocol and en-
sures continuous-ordering of client transactions. We envi-
sion MultiBFT to be readily integrated with several BFT
protocols such as Pbft [10], CBASE [36], FaB [46], ZZ [71]
and Zyzzyva [35].
(2) MultiBFT is not only safe and live, but also detects and de-
fends against collusion attacks that arise due to the existence
of multiple primaries.
1ResilientDB is a spin-off of ExpoDB [27, 56, 58], our exploratory data platform,
aiming at high-performance fault-resilient data processing.
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Figure 1: This diagram illustrates a set of replicas of which
somemay bemalicious or have crashed. The primary replica
leads the consensus on a client request it received among the
remaining replicas.
(3) We build a prototype blockchain database, ResilientDB, that
permits multiple of its replicas to act as primaries and em-
ploys ourMultiBFT paradigm. Further, we implemented the
architecture of each replica with efficient parallel pipelines
for better task management.
(4) We also evaluate ourMultiBFT paradigm against three state-
of-the-art BFT protocols: Zyzzyva [35], Pbft [10], and Hot-
Stuff [74]. We show that our paradigm attains a throughput
of up to 320K txns/s.
(5) The effectiveness and scalability of ourMultiBFT paradigm
is demonstrated by the fact that our paradigm achieves a
throughput of 210K txns/s on 46 replicas, which is at least
5× the throughput reported by existing blockchain database
systems and applications operating on only 4 replicas [3, 19,
25, 49, 57, 60, 72].
2 WHY BFT PROTOCOLS?
BFT protocols lie at the core of blockchain applications, which have
received sudden interest lately. The key reasons for this interest
are intertwined with the design of BFT protocols: they can pro-
vide reliable replication among untrusted replicas (decentralization)
while giving all replicas equal influence on replication (democracy).
Initial blockchain applications, such as Bitcoin [48], opted for a per-
missionless setting, where any replica can participate in consensus.
These applications employ the Proof-of-Work algorithm (PoW) for
achieving consensus among replicas [31]. However, PoW is suscep-
tible to attacks, computationally expensive, yields low throughput,
and incurs high latencies [20, 21, 26, 54, 55, 69].
This led the blockchain community to consider the design of
permissioned blockchains, which employ traditional BFT proto-
cols [10, 35]. By only allowing a known set of replicas to partici-
pate, permissioned blockchains can facilitate decentralization and
democracy with low costs and high performance. Consequently,
we see a rise in the design of permissioned blockchain database
systems (BDBs) that combine database and blockchain functional-
ity [3, 24, 25, 49].
These BDBs attain much less throughput than traditional data-
base systems, as BDBs employ unoptimized single-primary BFT
consensus protocols. Consequently, our MultiBFT paradigm is in
order, as it improves throughput significantly.
BFT protocol
Number of 
Instances (z)
Replication Unification Execution
Create z instances at
each replica and run z
parallel BFT instances.
Create a global order of
all the requests.
Execute the requests in a
global order and reply to
clients.
Figure 2: The three stages of theMultiBFT paradigm.
3 MULTIBFT
TheMultiBFT paradigm proposes to parallelize primary-backup
BFT consensus protocols. Using parallelization, MultiBFT ensures
that the resultant consensus protocol supports continuous-ordering:
the non-faulty replicas are always accepting and ordering client re-
quests with maximal throughput, this independent of any malicious
behavior or attack.
Figure 2 illustrates a succinct representation of ourMultiBFT
paradigm. For the sake of explanation, we present a single round of
MultiBFT in three stages: replication, unification, and execution. The
notion of a round helps in generating a common order and recover-
ing failed instances. Later, we discuss how the concept of rounds
does not affect individual primaries from working independently.
Prior to any round,MultiBFT takes as input a BFT consensus
protocol (say X ) and requires each replica to run z instances of that
protocol in parallel. A round begins when each instance receives
a request from a client.2 Firstly, in the replication stage, each in-
stance runs the protocol X on its client request. Secondly, in the
unification stage, the replica waits for all its z instances to complete
replication (reach consensus on a request). If every instance suc-
cessfully replicates a request, then a common order for execution of
these requests is determined. If one or more instances are unable to
replicate requests, then some of the instances must have byzantine
primaries and recovery is initiated. Finally, in the execution stage,
each replica executes all the client requests in the common order.
3.1 Preliminaries
To present our MultiBFT paradigm in detail, we first introduce
some notations and assumptions.We represent a replicated database
by a tripleS = (C ,R,M) in which C is the set of clients using the
service,R is the set of replicas andM ⊂ R is the set of malicious
replicas that exhibit byzantine behavior. We write n = |R | and
f = |M| to denote the number of replicas and malicious replicas,
respectively. We assume n > 3f . The set of non-faulty replicas,
denoted by nf(S), is defined as nf(S) = R \M.
With each replica R ∈ R, we associate a set of z = f +1 instances,
denoted is(R). We write is(S) = ⋃R∈R is(R) to denote the set of all
replica instances. To identify replicas and their instances we employ
numeric identifiers: we simply writeIi,x to denote the x-th instance
running on the i-th replica, 1 ≤ x ≤ z and 1 ≤ i ≤ n. With each
instance x , 1 ≤ x ≤ z, we associate a primary Px that coordinates
replication among all instances Ii,x , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We assume that
each instance has a distinct primary (running on distinct replicas),
that is, for all 1 ≤ x < y ≤ z, Px , Py .
We employ cryptography to prevent malicious replicas from im-
personating non-faulty replicas. Each client or replica s ∈ (C ∪R)
can signmessages [34]. Each client also has access to a cryptographic
hash function that it can use to generate digests D(v) of values v .
2We assume that each client request represents a transaction.
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We assume that malicious replicas cannot forge signed messages
and message digests of non-faulty replicas. A signed message is
well-formed if it passes all checks that guarantee its authenticity
and integrity.
Optimal Primary Set. In ResilientDB, we require a total of
z replicas to act as primary: at each replica there are z BFT in-
stances running concurrently. We use z = f + 1 as the minimal
value, which is sufficient to guarantee at least a single instance
with a non-faulty primary. This enables MultiBFT to support
the continuous-ordering property. Furthermore, using z = f + 1
already guarantees effective parallelism, this with minimal con-
tention among the instances for underlying resources. Several prior
works [23, 64] suggest using alln replicas as primary. This approach
has two counter-effects: (i) as the number of replicas increase, there
exists a trade-off between the contention among the instances for
available resources (underlying cores) and useful parallelism; and
(ii) if even one of the replicas is malicious or byzantine, the system
throughput can get affected.
Client Replica Mapping. We require each primary to order (or
replicate) client transactions. A malicious client can abuse this de-
sign in request duplication attacks, in which it sends a single request
to distinct primaries. Such an attack would waste resources. To
prevent request duplication, MultiBFT partitions the clients C
into z sets C0, . . . ,Cz−1, and assigns each client C , C ∈ C , with
identifier id(C) to set Cid(C) mod z . All requests from clients in Cx
are handled by the primary of the x-th instance. This deterministic
distribution of clients prevents request duplication attacks. How-
ever, it does allow malicious primaries to ignore requests of some
of its assigned clients, causing a denial-of-service attack. We discuss
how to prevent denial-of-service in Section 3.6.
3.2 Stages of MultiBFT
In each round of MultiBFT, each of the z instances at a replica
run their BFT consensuses in parallel, after which the instances
coordinate to ensure that all replicas reach the same state. To do so,
the following three steps take place:
(S1) Replication: Each instance x , 1 ≤ x ≤ z, replicates a request
Tx corresponding to some client request.
(S2) Unification: All the z instances unify to ensure that each
non-faulty replica receives all the z requests T1, . . . , Tz .
(S3) Execution: The requests T1, . . . , Tz are executed in a deter-
ministic order.
Figure 3 illustrates these three steps in detail. Replication is
achieved by running a BFT consensus protocol that meets the fol-
lowing four requirements:
(R1) If the primary is not detected faulty, then at least n − 2f ≥
f + 1 non-faulty replicas will learn a request.
(R2) If f +1 non-faulty replicas are unable to learn a request, then
the primary will be detected as faulty.
(R3) If two non-faulty replicas learn requests T1 and T2, then
T1 = T2.
(R4) A primary can always be replaced.
The second step, unification, performs minimal coordination
among the z instances at each replica to ensure client transactions
Create f+1 instances at each replica. 
Mark f+1 replicas as primaries.
Replica 1 primary Instance 1
Replica 2 primary Instance 2
.
Replica f+1 primary Instance f+1 
Divide clients into f+1 sets.
Each primary runs independent 
input BFT consensus.
Each client sends 
request to its primary.
Execute thread waits for 
f+1 instances to 
replicate their client requests.
Coordinator thread receives f+1 view 
change messages for same primary.
An instance 
replicates its client request.
An instance 
requests a view change.
Forward incoming view change 
messages to coordinator thread.
Coordinator waits for each f+1 instance 
to replicate its client request or 
f+1 view change messages. 
Coordinator assigns a new primary to each 
instance with f+1 view change messages. 
Each replica with 
new primary
switches to new view.
Execute thread executes each request in order.
Each instance replies to its client.
Replication
Unification
Execution
Input 
BFT protocol.
Figure 3: An overview of theMultiBFT paradigm.
are executed in a deterministic order, regardless of the byzantine
replicas. Next, we describe these steps.
3.3 Replication
MultiBFT supports any BFT protocols that is based on the primary-
backup design of Pbft. Given such a protocol, MultiBFT requires
each replica to independently run z instances of the protocol in
parallel:
Definition 3.1. MultiBFT models each replica R as a set of in-
stances is(R). Each instance IR,x ∈ is(R), 1 ≤ x ≤ z, operates a BFT
consensus protocol as a black-box. In a single round r , each instance
undergoes a single consensus. Each instance either successfully
completes consensus or observes that the consensus has failed.
If the x-th instance at a replica completes the consensus suc-
cessfully in round r , then the corresponding primary Px behaved
non-faulty. In other words, Px was able to replicate a client transac-
tion across all the x-th instances. If the x-th instance at a replica
observes that the consensus has failed, then MultiBFT expects the
underlying BFT protocol to provide steps to help detect the faulty
primary, such thatMultiBFT can coordinate recovery.
Correctness of Per-Instance Replication. We require that the BFT
protocol used at each instance is correct. If the primary Px is non-
faulty, then each non-faulty replica will be able to complete consen-
sus of the x-th instance and log a proof of accepting the request Tx .
A correct consensus protocol guarantees that only a single client re-
quest can get accepted and logged per consensus (Requirement R3).
Note that Pbft-style protocols state that a client request can only
get accepted if it has been acknowledged by at least n − f ≥ 2f + 1
replicas. Out of these n − f replicas, at least n − 2f ≥ f + 1 replicas
(a majority) are non-faulty, as at most f replicas can be byzan-
tine [10, 35].
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However, if the primary Px behaves faulty (or malicious), then
not all the x-th instances will accept and log the request. A pri-
mary can broadly behave malicious in two distinct ways, which we
describe next.
If the primary Px is faulty, then consensus on a client request
could be reached among less than f + 1 non-faulty replicas. (e.g.,
Px may not send the client request Tx to at least f + 1 non-faulty
replicas). Hence, no non-faulty replica will accept and log the client
request Tx . Existing BFT consensus protocols deal with this behav-
ior using a view-change protocol that uses a bounded-delay assump-
tion on message delivery [10, 11, 71]. The view-change protocol
requires each replica to: locally detect failure of consensus by using
timers; notify other replicas about the lack of progress by sending
a view-change request; reach agreement on primary failure (after
receiving at least f + 1 view-change requests, which guarantees
that one request came from a non-faulty replica); deterministically
elect the new primary, and finally, replace the primary. Hence, the
view-change protocol helps meet Requirements R2 and R4.
If the primary is malicious, then it can ensure that consensus
is reached among a set S of at least n − 2f ≥ f + 1 non-faulty
replicas, In this case, only the non-faulty replicas in S accept and
log the client request Tx , and the primary can collude with the other
malicious replicas and ensure that the remaining non-faulty replicas
are unable to reach consensus on Tx (are left in the dark). Clearly,
these remaining replicas will request a view-change, but will not
be successful. To succeed, some of the replicas in S also have to
request a view-change, but from their point of view it is impossible
to distinguish between the non-faulty replicas left in the dark (at
most f ) and the malicious replicas (also at most f ). Correct BFT
protocols typically provide a checkpoint protocol [10, 35], which
facilitates state-exchange, to ensure that eventually all replicas are
able to learn all replicated requests, independent of any malicious
behavior of the primary.
3.4 Unification
In the previous section, we saw that each instance at each replica
is led by its own primary and will try to replicate a client request
in each round r . After this replication, there is a need to determine
a global order for all the requests replicated successfully by the z
instances. To determine this order, MultiBFT provides unification,
which performs the following three tasks: (i) global ordering; (ii)
unified multi-leader election; and (iii) online recovery.
3.4.1 Deterministic Global Ordering. Unification guarantees execu-
tion of client requests in a common order across all replicas. If all z
instances at a replica are able to successfully replicate their requests,
then we execute these requests in a deterministic order. For this
purpose, we employ a separate execute-thread at each replica. When
an instance replicates its client request in round r , it notifies the
execute-thread. If the execute-thread receives notification from all z
instances (and has already executed requests for round r − 1), then
it executes the requests of round r . One can simply execute the
requests in the instance order. For example, if x < y, then requests
of the y-th instance are executed after requests of the x-th instance.
Alternative Approach to Order Requests. Although determinis-
tic ordering of requests is simple, it also gives earlier instances
disproportional control over execution.
To resolve this shortcoming, we propose deterministic selection
of a different permutation of the order of execution in every round.
For any sequence S of k = |S | ≤ z requests, there exist k! distinct
permutations. To select one of these permutations deterministically
among all replicas, we first will construct a function that maps an
integerh ∈ {0, . . . ,k!−1} to a unique permutation. Then we discuss
how the replicas will uniformly pick h. As there are k! permutations
of S , we can construct the bijection:
fS (h) =
{
S if |S | = 1;
fS\S [q](r ) ⊕ S[q] if |S | > 1,
in which q = h div(|S | − 1)! is the quotient of integer division by
(|S | − 1)!, r = h mod (|S | − 1)! is the remainder of integer division
by (|S | − 1)!, and ⊕ is list concatenation.
The result of fS (D(S) mod |S |!), with D(D) the digest of the se-
quence S of all replicated requests of the round, allows all non-faulty
replicas to determine a fair and correct order of execution. This
approach ensures that no instance has any reliable influence on the
order in which the client requests of a single round are executed
across all the replicas.
3.4.2 Unified Multi-Leader Election. If an x-th instance is led by a
faulty primary, then it might fail to replicate a request. As stated in
Section 3.3, this only happens if the faulty primary Px affects the x-
th instances running at at least f +1 non-faulty replicas. Traditional
BFT protocols are able to detect and replace such a primary through
the view-change protocol. However, the replacement suggested by
these protocols does not work for a parallel paradigm likeMultiBFT.
Example 3.2. Consider round r of MultiBFT where two replicas
R5 and R6 are each running three instances in parallel. The first and
second instances both detect that their primaries (residing on repli-
cas R1 and R2, respectively) need to be replaced. Hence instances
I5,1, I5,2, I6,1, and I6,2 are replacing their primaries. At R5, the first
instance I5,1 detects a need for primary replacement before the
second instance, I5,2. Due to random delays in communication and
parallel processing, at R6 the second instance I6,2 detects a need
for primary replacement before the first instance, I6,1.
If we replace the primaries at each instance without any coor-
dination between the instances, then each instance would simply
pick the first available replica to be its primary. We require one
replica to be the primary of only one instance. Hence, we will use
the next two freely available replicas, say R3 and R4. At R5, I5,1
chooses I3,1 as its primary, and I5,2 chooses I4,2 as its primary.
At R6, I6,2 chooses I3,2 as its primary, and I6,1 chooses I4,1 as its
primary. Due to the lack of coordination, there is no agreement on
the primaries for the first and second instances between R5 and R6
and at least one of these replicas will fail in future rounds.
Example 3.2 shows that traditional approach of replacing one pri-
mary cannot be used to replace multiple primaries. Our unified pri-
mary replacement protocol, part of unification, helps to resolve this
situation.We require each non-faulty replica to maintain an internal
state (primary, kmal, replace), in which primary : {1, . . . , z} → R
maps each instance onto its primary, kmal ⊆ M is the set of known
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Figure 4: Attack by malicious primaries (P1 and P2), which
send operations to only a safe subset of good replicas (f + 1).
faulty replicas, and replace is a list of instances that request pri-
mary replacement. Each entry in replace is of the form (x , r ), with
x , 1 ≤ x ≤ z, being the instance that detects its primary faulty and
r being the round when this detection occurs.
At each replica,MultiBFT employs a separate coordinator-thread
to maintain this internal state. If the x-th instance at replica Ri , de-
termines in round r that its primary (primary[x]) is malicious, then
it places an entry (x , r ) in replace and waits until the coordinator
assigns a new primary.
The coordinator at Ri handles entries in replace in increasing
round number, and, for entries with the same round number, on
increasing instance order. The coordinator only handles an entry
(x , r ) ∈ replace if each instance at replica Ri has either replicated a
request in round r or has requested replacement of its primary.
From Requirement R2 it can be deduced that each instance will
always detect in which round its primary became faulty (as that
instance is unable to make progress). Thus, the order in which the
coordinator handles the entries for replacements guarantees that
all primaries are replaced in the same order across all instances
at all replicas. To handle (x , r ) ∈ replace, the coordinator removes
(x , r ) from replace, adds primary[x] to kmal, and then looks for
the first replica R < kmal that is not yet a primary (for all j, 1 ≤
j ≤ z, primary[j] , R). It then assigns primary[x] = R and signals
the x-th instance that a new primary is assigned, after which the
new primary of the x-th instance can initiate recovery of the x-th
instance. to recover. Note that due to Requirement R4, a correct
BFT protocol provides such steps for replacing a primary [10, 35].
3.4.3 Online Recovery. It is always possible that a primary acts
malicious without being detected. In Section 3.3, we illustrated how
traditional BFT protocols can be under such an undetectable attack.
Note that even under such an attack, traditional BFT protocols
continue to maintain both safety and liveness. However, when a
system has multiple primary replicas, then collusion among the
malicious replicas can endanger progress of the system:
Example 3.3. Consider a service S with f ≥ 2 and malicious
replicas are represented by setM , |M | = f . We have f +1 primaries
andwe assume that the first two primaries,P1 andP2, aremalicious.
P1 and P2 collude and partition the non-faulty replicas into three
sets A, B, and C with |A| = |B | = f and |C | = 1 (see Figure 4). Now
consider round r in which P1 initiates consensus for a request T1
and involves only the replicas in sets (M ∪A∪C), while P2 initiates
consensus for request T2 and involves only the replicas in sets
(M ∪B∪C). All other byzantine replicas collude with the primaries
P1 and P2 by being involved in consensus for both the requests.
Each primary runs independent 
input BFT consensus.
Execute thread waits for 
f+1 instances to 
replicate their client requests.
Coordinator thread receives f+1 view 
change messages for distinct primaries.
An instance 
replicates its client request.
An instance 
requests a view change.
Forward incoming view change 
messages to coordinator thread.
If before timer expires, 
coordinator receives f+1 view 
change message for an instance.
Coordinator assigns a new 
primary to that instance.
Replication
Unification
Coordinator starts a timer and waits.
If timer expires and f+1 view 
change messages exist for at 
least two instances. 
Coordinator detects attack 
of Example 2.3.
Coordinator collects requests (and proof) of 
each of its instances that replicated a request 
in round r and sends it to all the replicas. 
Figure 5: MultiBFT paradigm detecting collusion attack
and resolving it through optimistic recovery.
Hence, in round r , the non-faulty replicas inA only reach consensus
on T1, the non-faulty replicas in B only reach consensus on T2, and
only the one non-faulty replica in C reaches consensus on both T1
and T2. If f ≥ 3, then the above example can be easily extended to
ensure that none of the non-faulty replicas reach consensus on all
the requests.
The situation in Example 3.3 is of our interest, as it is a result of
existence of multiple primaries. Traditional BFT protocols do not
face this attack as they only have one primary [10, 35]. Whenever
there are multiple primaries, then up to f of them can be byzantine,
and each can act malicious by preventing at most f of the replicas
from replicating a request. As shown above, this can lead to a
situation in which none of the non-faulty replicas have all the
requests replicated in a round.
Such a collusion attack would prevent the non-faulty replicas
from executing any request and replying to the clients. Further,
these malicious primaries cannot be replaced by view-change, as at
most f non-faulty replicas are blaming each suchmalicious primary
(while, at the same time, the f byzantine replicas can blame the
non-faulty primaries).Why is this attack so critical? If unhandled,
it can cause the system to lack liveness (non-faulty replicas are
unable to progress).
To address this attack, we first need to detect it. We assign the
task of detecting such an attack to the coordinator thread. When the
x-th instance at a replica is unable to replicate a request in round r ,
it sends a view-change message to all the other x-th instances and
notifies the coordinator thread. To detect this attack, the coordina-
tor thread uses a timer and waits for f + 1 view-change requests
from distinct replicas (and possibly for distinct primaries). If the
timer expires and there are not sufficient view-change requests to
replace any primaries, then the coordinator detects the attack of
Example 3.3.
Note that the coordinator has to distinguish between this at-
tack and the traditional view-change expected by an instance. In
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both cases, the coordinator waits for f + 1 messages, but the dis-
tinction lies whether these messages are blaming one primary or
multiple primaries. In Figure 5 we illustrate how the coordinator
differentiates between these attacks (as part of unification).
There are three ways to defend against such an attack: (i) op-
timistic recovery; (ii) pessimistic recovery; and (iii) optimistic re-
placement. We explain each of them next.
(1) Optimistic Recovery. On detection of the attack of Exam-
ple 3.3, unification requires the coordinator-thread at each
replica to create and transmit a contract to all the other repli-
cas. This contract contains all requests replicated in round r
(across all instances), together with proofs that these requests
were accepted by |nf(S)| replicas.3 This contract proves
to an affected x-th instance that |nf(S)| x-th instances, at
other replicas, have replicated the corresponding request
in round r . When a coordinator receives a contract from
another replica, then it forwards the individual requests and
their proofs to the affected instances. Using this informa-
tion, each instance at a non-faulty replica can determine the
request it should have accepted in round r .
(2) Pessimistic Recovery. Instead of letting the coordinator
wait until it detects the attack of Example 3.3, we can also
simply create and send contracts after every round. In this
case, the coordinator acts pessimistic by assuming some
primaries are malicious. The benefit of this approach is that
there is no wait time if the system is under attack. However,
it always adds an extra phase of communication among the
replicas, even if the system is not under attack.
(3) Optimistic Replacement. Detecting the attack of Exam-
ple 3.3 provides enough information to determine some pri-
maries are malicious, even if it is impossible to pinpoint
which primaries are malicious. One way to deal with this
situation, is by simply switching to another set of z pri-
maries in a deterministic fashion. We notice that there are
only a finite number of such sets of primaries, hence, one
can easily pre-determine a unique order among each such
set of primaries. Eventually, this view-shifting process will
find a set of non-faulty replicas, preventing future attacks.
Although view-shifting works, we do not consider it for prac-
tical purposes: view-shifting requires coordination among
instances with non-faulty primaries, thereby undoing the
continuous-ordering property.
3.5 Parallelization Landscape
Our MultiBFT paradigm permits z instances, each coordinated
by a distinct primary, to replicate client requests in parallel. In
the fault-free case, instances at individual replicas only coordinate
execution, this to ensure each replica executes all requests in the
same order and, hence, preserves the same state. In the case of
failures, coordination is only required between instances with failed
primaries, and the cost of coordination is dependent on the cost of
the view-change protocol of the underlying BFT protocol.
As we require z > f primary replicas, at least one primary is
always guaranteed to be good. The instance corresponding to this
3In Pbft-based protocols such a proof includes the messages from the prepare and
commit phases.
primary can continue replicating requests even if other instances
have failed. Hence, it is possible that two or more instances at a
replica may be replicating requests for different rounds. For exam-
ple, if the x-th instance is led by a good primary, then it could be
replicating requests for some round r + 2, while the y-th instance
is trying to replace its primary (which failed in round r ).
We have designedMultiBFT explicitly such that good instances
never have to wait for other instances to replicate its requests. This
property can be leveraged by the non-faulty replicas to continuously
provide replication and ordering throughput, even during failures.
This continuous-ordering property is a departure from existing
BFT protocols, which typically see large drops of throughput while
dealing with failures (e.g., during view-changes).
The only requirementMultiBFT needs for correctness, is that
the execution of client requests occurs in rounds. Hence, even
though the x-th instance is replicating requests for round r + 2, its
requests of round r will only get executed at a replica after all the z
instances at that replica have finished round r .
3.6 Resolving Client Denial-of-Service
It is possible that a client is assigned to an instance of which the
primary decides to indefinitely ignore its request. Typical BFT con-
sensus protocols have ways to detect such behavior as part of their
view-change protocol. We also allow clients to change instances:
a client can send an instance-change request to another instance.
If this instance has a non-faulty primary, then it will accept this
request (if it does not yet have a sufficient number of clients, this
to prevent targeted attacks by malicious clients).
4 MULTIBFT IN ACTION
We now illustrate our MultiBFT paradigm by running z instances
of the Pbft [10] protocol at each replica. In Figure 6(a), we assume
n = 4 replicas are participating in consensus and up to f = 1 repli-
cas can be byzantine. Each replica runs 2 Pbft instances in parallel
(z = f +1). Each instance has a distinct primary, we designate P1 (at
replica 1) as the primary for first instance and P2 (at replica 2) as the
primary for second instance. Each instance receives a transaction
from its own client(s).
For the sake of explanation, we only illustrate the normal-case
working of Pbft and skip over other protocol details. When a client
(C1 orC2) sends a transaction to its primary (P1 or P2), the primary
starts the Pbft protocol to replicate this transaction. The Pbft
protocol requires three phases. In the first phase, each primary
assigns a sequence number to the client transaction and proposes
this transaction via a Pre-Preparemessage to all its corresponding
instances (e.g., P1 sends to all the first instances at each replica).
When an instance receives a Pre-Prepare message from its pri-
mary, it validates the client transaction (checks authenticity of this
transaction) and then shows support for the sequence number pro-
posed by the primary by broadcasting a Preparemessage. When an
instance receives identical Prepare messages from n − (f + 1) cor-
responding instances (at distinct replicas), then it gets a guarantee
that a majority of the non-faulty instances are also supporting this
transaction, and this instance marks itself as prepared. Next, this
instance goes ahead and broadcasts a Commit message. When an
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Figure 6:MultiBFT with f = 1, running 2 parallel instances of different primary backup consensus protocols.
instance receives n− f identical Commitmessages, it gets a guaran-
tee that a majority of the non-faulty instances marked themselves
as prepared, and it informs the execution thread. The execution
thread waits for both the instances to finish and then executes the
transactions and sends responses to the clients.
When the primary of an instance is faulty, then that instance
waits on a timer and on timeout sends a View-Change message to
all the corresponding instances. The coordinator thread collects any
incoming View-Change messages and follows our MultiBFT par-
adigm to perform unified primary replacement. The new primary
instance broadcasts a New-View message to its corresponding in-
stances and resumes the protocol.
Figure 6(b) illustrates a single round of MultiBFT employing
Zyzzyva [35]. As Zyzzyva uses speculative execution, it attempts
to reach consensus among the replicas in a single phase.4 Protocols
belonging to Zyzzyva family [22, 35, 71] also satisfy the Require-
ments R1–R4 whenever there is a good client (in Zyzzyva, good
clients help in detecting malicious primaries).
5 CORRECTNESS PROOFS
We now prove correctness of ourMultiBFT paradigm and other
properties stated in previous sections. First, we introduce the fol-
lowing technical property of unified primary replacement.
Lemma 5.1. MultiBFTwill replace the primaries in a deterministic
order across all the non-faulty replicas.
Proof. Assume that the primaries Px and Py , running at the
x-th and y-th instances, are malicious and need to be replaced
(x , y). By Requirement R2, all the x-th and y-th instances will
detect that Px and Py are malicious in some rounds rx and ry . Let
R1 and R2 be two non-faulty replicas that have the same internal
state (primaryi , kmali , replacei ), i ∈ {1, 2}, before replacement of
Px and Py . We will prove that R1 and R2 end up with the same
internal state after unified primary replacement.
4 Although Zyzzyva has been shown to be unsafe [2], we use this figure to show how
MultiBFT can be used with different protocols.
If rx < ry or (rx = ry ) ∧ (x < y), then Ri will first replace Px ,
after which Py is replaced. Otherwise, either ry < rx or (ry =
rx ) ∧ (y < x) holds, and Ri first replaces Py , after which Px is
replaced. As R1 and R2 have the same internal states and both
execute the same replacement steps in the same order, they end up
with the same internal state on completion of MultiBFT’s unified
primary replacement. □
The MultiBFT paradigm can be used to implement a reliable
consensus protocol that exploits parallel replication. The paradigm
does so by providing the following properties:
Safety property. All the non-faulty replicas in the service will
accept, log, and execute the same client-requests in the same
order.
Liveness property. The service will eventually accept, log, and
execute new client-requests.
Continuous-ordering property. At all times, the service will ac-
cept and log client-requests from some of the clients.
Theorem 5.2. The MultiBFT paradigm provides safety, liveness,
and continuous-ordering properties when the underlying consensus
protocol running at each instance satisfies the three requirements
outlined in Section 3.3.
Proof. First, we prove safety. We observe that we require safety
at the instance level. Through Requirement R3, we know that each
instance eventually replicates a unique sequence of transactions
among n − 2f non-faulty replicas, one transaction per round. Oth-
erwise, the primary of the instance will get replaced due to Re-
quirement R2 and our unified primary replacement protocol. Given
this per-instance guarantee and the online recovery provided by
unification, all replicas will eventually learn all requests accepted
in a round by each of the instances. As all replicas then determine
the same deterministic order among the requests of a round, we
conclude thatMultiBFT guarantees safety.
Next, we prove liveness. Liveness is automatically provided when-
ever all primaries are non-faulty (via Requirement R1). Due to the
assumption thatn ≥ 3f +1, there are more than z = f +1 non-faulty
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Figure 7: The primary replica pipeline of MultiBFT.
replicas. Hence all primaries can be non-faulty. Thus, we need to
show that malicious primaries that prevent liveness are eventu-
ally replaced by primaries that do not prevent liveness. When a
primary is malicious and prevents its instance from completing a
round r , then this would invalidate liveness. Via Requirement R2,
we are guaranteed that this will be detected in round r . Further,
Lemma 5.1 tells us thatMultiBFTwill eventually propose a correct
replacement primary for the affected instance, across all non-faulty
replicas. This will lead to a new primary leading the instance. We
conclude that eventually all malicious primaries that prevent live-
ness will be detected and replaced, after which all primaries are
non-faulty, and liveness is guaranteed.
Finally, we prove continuous-ordering. In MultiBFT, z = f + 1
primaries are coordinating z instances. Hence, at least one instance
is coordinated by a non-faulty primary. This instance accepts and
logs client-transactions independent of the other instances, which
implies that the transactions of a subset of clients are continuously
ordered. □
6 THE DESIGN OF RESILIENTDB
While laying down the formal description of MultiBFT in the pre-
vious section, we made several assumptions that can be relaxed in
implementations. Next, we provide specific details of our imple-
mentation as part of the ResilientDB blockchain database system
that (1) employs parallel pipelines to maximize throughput; (2) uti-
lizes batching to minimize latency; (3) eases implementation of new
consensus protocols; and (4) provides an efficient blockchain.
Pipelining. One of the key assumption in our description was
that each instance performs consensus on only one client-request
at a time. In specific, we required an instance to wait for a request
to replicate before it can start consensus on the next request. Such
an assumption is neither practical, necessary, nor is it followed by
any existing BFT consensus protocol [10, 35]. Hence, we learn from
existing protocols and we pipeline consensuses of multiple requests.
Example 6.1. Assume thatPx is the primary for the x-th instance
and it starts consensus on request T1 in round r . When Px gets the
next client request T2, it marks T2 for round r + 1 and immediately
starts consensus on T2. For efficiency, we will not let Px wait for
either round r to complete or request T1 to replicate to the x-th
instances on all replicas.
For ResilientDB, the existence of multiple primaries adds no
extra difficulty in pipelining, as each primary always specifies the
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Figure 8: The non-primary replica pipeline of MultiBFT.
round number for each proposed request and can start the consen-
sus for that request. As each instance only replicates one request
per consensus round (Lemma ??), pipelining consensuses does not
affect safety. Only the execution-thread uses the notion of rounds
to deterministically execute the requests in a unified and correct
order.
Designing each replica. In ResilientDB, we associate with
each replica a distinct architecture based on the role. Figure 7
presents the architecture for a replica which has an instance act-
ing as the primary. Figure 8 presents the architecture for a replica
where none of the instances act as primaries.
In our design, ResilientDB associates multiple input and out-
put threads with each replica. The input-threads receive a set of
messages from the network and place them in necessary queues
for consumption. At each replica, we have z worker-threads, one
for each of the z instances. If one of these instances is also acting
as a primary, then the associated replica has two additional batch-
threads. Other threads in our design include the execute-thread and
coordinator-thread.
Batching. Besides pipelining consensuses and allowing multiple
threads to work in parallel, primary replicas in ResilientDB also
employ the practice of batching transactions. When batching is
employed, each replica treats a batch of transaction as a single
request and participates in the consensus of that batch. We also
allow clients to send a batch of transactions as a request to optimize
sending multiple transactions. Such a practice is typically employed
in applications when client perform multiple queries on a database,
e.g., financial transactions and service-agreements.
We require the input-thread to assign each incoming client-batch
a linearly increasing number. Next, the input-thread places this
batch of client transactions in the queue for batch-threads. The
batch-threads create transaction managers for each client transac-
tion, batches them together and assigns them a sequence number
based on the number set by the input-thread. Prior to creating
any batch, the batch-threads also need to validate the client re-
quest, which usually requires verifying the client signatures on the
request [10].
When the input-thread at a replica receives a batch, it places it
in the queue for the specific worker-thread (one of the z workers).
This worker-thread processes this batch according to the underlying
consensus protocol (such as preprepare-prepare-commit in Pbft).
When a worker-thread accepts the order for its batch, it informs the
execute-thread. The execute-thread processes the incoming batch
in order, creates responses for the clients, and asks the output-
thread to send these responses to the clients. In case of failures the
execute-thread also performs the role of a coordinator.
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Storage and Ledger Management. ResilientDB facilitates im-
plementation of a scalable and efficient blockchain ledger. A blockchain
in its simplest form is a linked-list of blocks. Each replica of Re-
silientDB maintains its own copy of the blockchain and uses it to
record the client transactions.
The first block in any blockchain is referred to as the genesis
block [26]. This genesis block, BG contains a dummy value. To
ensure that each replica has an identical dummy value, we ask each
replica to assume this block contains a hash of the initial list of
primaries, BG := H (P1,P2, ...,Pz ).
To guarantee validity of a blockchain, standard blockchain de-
signs [21] suggest that each subsequent block (Bi ) in the ledger
includes the hash of the previous block (Bi−1) in the chain, that
is, Bi = {H (Bi−1), ...}. In ResilientDB, we employ theMultiBFT
paradigm which takes as input a BFT consensus protocol, which
ensure that all the requests for each round are replicated. Hence,
we can construct a proof of such replication. Such a proof already
yields a guarantee that the newly created block is valid.
We require the execute-thread to create a new block for round
r once it completes executing all the transactions for a round r .
In this block, the execute-thread stores: (i) proof of replication for
all the z client requests executed in round r , (ii) identifiers of the
primaries of all the z instances, and (iii) identifiers of the clients.
Note that we do not store the client requests and the responses in
the ledger, we store these in a separate table indexed by the round
number. Further, our ResilientDB also provides an in-memory
key-value store. This key-value store provides fast access to client
records.
CryptographicConstructs.ResilientDB supports efficient sign-
ing and verification of messages. We employ NIST recommended
cryptographic [5] constructs for secure communication. To sign
messages between replicas, we use message authentication codes
based on CMAC-AES. For communication between client and repli-
cas, we employ ED25519-based digital signatures [34]. To ensure
integrity of messages, we use SHA256 [50, 65] to generate hashes
message digests.
7 EVALUATION
We now present an empirical evaluation of our MultiBFT par-
adigm on ResilientDB against the well-known Pbft, Zyzzyva,
and HotStuff consensus protocols. AsMultiBFT takes as input
any primary-backup BFT protocol, we created MultiBFT variants
of Pbft and Zyzzyva, which we denote by MultiP and MultiZ,
respectively. As HotStuff changes primary in every consensus
round, we did not build a MultiBFT variant of this protocol. In
specific, the goal of our evaluation is to answer the following ques-
tions:
(Q1) How does theMultiBFT paradigm (MultiP andMultiZ)
compares to the protocols Pbft and Zyzzyva?
(Q2) How does the system performance of theMultiBFT para-
digm compare to HotStuff?
(Q3) DoesMultiBFT benefit from batching client requests?
(Q4) How scalable is MultiBFT with respect to the number of
replicas?
(Q5) How scalable is MultiBFT under multiple replica failures
and collusion attack?
7.1 Other Protocols in ResilientDB
For fair comparison, we also associate our parallel-pipelined ar-
chitecture of ResilientDB with the other three protocols, Pbft,
Zyzzyva and HotStuff. Further, we allow these protocols to also
employ batching and permit them to proceed with consensus of a
succeeding request, while the consensus on the preceding request
is ongoing. As theMultiBFT paradigm allows f + 1 instances to
work in parallel, we also parallelize the tasks in both Pbft and
Zyzzyva by giving them 12 threads (three threads each for input,
output and batching, and one thread each for worker, execution
and checkpoints).
HotStuff [74] incurs a latency of four phases to replicate a
request. In their paper, the authors lay down two designs, one that
requires threshold signatures and the other that needs proofs from
the primary. In HotStuff, each phase consists of two subphases:
the primary replica starts each phase by broadcasting a message,
and each replica only replies back to the primary. The primary
then combines these replies and send a summary back to the repli-
cas (e.g., by forwarding digital signatures of all messages, which
can be compressed using threshold signatures). Interestingly, the
evaluation of HotStuff neither uses threshold signatures, nor is
there any available standard implementation. Hence, we also skip
using threshold signatures. We opt to not penalize HotStuff with
large summaries, either. Note that, in any case, HotStuff requires
expensive digital signatures in each phase, which are not required
by other BFT protocols such as Pbft. HotStuff changes its pri-
mary replica after every third phase; our implementation optimizes
this primary change by allowing all consecutive primaries to run in
parallel, making HotStuff another parallel protocol.
7.2 Setup
Our experiments are performed on the Google Cloud. We deploying
our replicas on c2machines with a 16-core Intel Xeon Cascade Lake
CPU running at 3.8GHz and with 32GB memory. For large setups,
we use 30-core machines with 60GB memory. We deploy up to 1
million clients on 50 machines. We run each experiment for 180
seconds: the 60 seconds are warmup, and results are collected over
the next 120 seconds. We average our results over three runs. In
all experiments, we use batching with a batch size to 100, unless
explicitly stated otherwise. With a batch size of 100, the size of
Pre-Prepare messages is 5400 bytes, Response messages is 1748
bytes, and other messages are 250 bytes.
In each experiment, the workload is provided by the Yahoo Cloud
Serving Benchmark (YCSB) [16]. Each client request queries a YCSB
table that holds half an million active records. We require 90% of the
requests to be write queries. Prior to the experiments, each replica
is initialized with an identical copy of the YCSB table. The client
requests generated by YCSB follow a Zipfian distribution and are
heavily skewed (skew factor 0.9).
7.3 Impact of Batching
First, we analyze the performance of all five consensus protocols as
a function of the batch size. We use batch sizes between 10 and 800.
For these experiments, we employ 32 replicas for consensus. Hence,
in both MultiP and MultiZ, we have 11 instances replicating
requests in parallel.
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Figure 9: System performance as a function of the batch size with n = 32 replicas.
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Figure 10: System performance as a function of the number of replicas with 100 requests/batch.
Figure 9(a) illustrates the throughput attained by these protocols.
MultiZ attains the highest throughput among all the protocols on
varying the batch size. This behavior is expected, as each replica in
MultiZ has to undergo just one phase and is running 11 instances in
parallel. However, there are cases where both MultiP and MultiZ
attain nearly the same throughput. The key bottleneck for these
MultiBFT variants is the execute-thread. Note that the execute-
thread not only has to sequentially execute all client transactions,
but also creates and signs client responses. Hence, even though
MultiZ sends out much less messages thanMultiP, the execute-
thread limits its throughput.
Protocols like Pbft and Zyzzyva are limited by their design as
there is no available parallelism. It is Zyzzyva’s single phase that
helps it to achieve much higher throughput than Pbft. However,
when the batch size is very large, Zyzzyva also starts saturating due
to single worker-thread handling all the tasks at the non-primary
replicas. Finally, HotStuff faces low throughput due to use of
expensive digital signatures, which makes its worker-thread com-
putationally bounded. Furthermore, HotStuff incurs a latency of
four phases. In our ResilientDB, we give HotStuff an optimistic
implementation with two batching threads at each replica, we allow
all of its replicas to act as primaries, and do not require it to send
any proofs. Despite this, it still has low throughput.
As the size of the batch increases, the throughput increases for
all protocols. This increase is more pronounced when transitioning
between smaller batch sizes. At smaller batch sizes, each replica has
to undergo a larger number of consensuses. Hence, they have low
throughputs. By aggregating requests into larger batches, fewer
rounds of consensuses are required, which in turn helps in increas-
ing the system throughput. However, for the larger batches, all
protocols see their throughputs reaching saturation. This is a re-
sult of high communication costs due to the transmission of large
batches. These results show thatMultiZ is able to attain up to 74%
more throughput than Zyzzyva,MultiP attains 2× more through-
put than Pbft and 3.2× more than HotStuff.
Figure 9(b) presents the average latency in sending a response
to the client for its transaction. In these figures, we observe that
Pbft, in general, incurs higher latencies than the other protocols.
This is a result of Pbft requiring three phases to replicate a request.
The client latency reduces substantially for the Pbft protocol when
increasing the batch size. Among the twoMultiBFT variants,Mul-
tiP has the least latency. This might seem surprising, but it is an
artifact of Zyzzyva’s design. In Zyzzyva, each client waits for mes-
sages from all n ≥ 3f + 1 replicas. Hence, when the system is
under high load (such as in MultiZ where there are 11 parallel
instances), the client has to wait for the slowest replica, whereas in
Pbft the client only has to wait for the fastest f + 1 replicas. Due to
similar reasons, Zyzzyva has higher latency than Pbft. However,
Pbft andHotStuff incur 2× and 3.22×more latency thanMultiP,
respectively
7.4 Impact on Scalability
Next, we study the performance of different consensus protocols
as a function of the number of replicas participating in consensus.
We use between 4 and 46 replicas.5 For bothMultiP andMultiZ
5 The maximum number of virtual machines available at our disposal.
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the number of parallel instances depend on the total number of
replicas. E.g., with n = 16 replicas, we have 6 primary instances,
each of which is on a distinct replica.
Figure 10(a) shows that on increasing the number of replicas,
there is a decrease in throughput for each protocol. This decrease
could be attributed to the subsequent increase in communication.
For example, in the Pbft protocol the 16 replicas transmit 256
messages in the Commit phase, in comparison to 16 messages
transmitted for a setup having 4 replicas. This quadratic increase in
the number of messages transmitted causes the observed reduction
in throughput.
We observe that the relative increase in parallelism in ourMulti-
BFT variants offsets the decrease in throughput significantly com-
pared to Pbft and Zyzzyva. Indeed, we observe that MultiBFT
benefits from increasing the number of replicas, even if the un-
derlying protocols suffer from higher communication costs: the
performance of Pbft drops by 41% (43% for Zyzzyva) whereas the
performance of MultiP only drops by 22% (26% forMultiZ) when
moving from 32 to 46 replicas. Hence, the parallel nature of Multi-
BFT improves scalability. The benefit of these parallel instances can
also be observed when moving from 4 to 8 replicas: in this case,
MultiP sees an increase in throughput. Furthermore, due to their
parallelism, bothMultiP andMultiZ are able to achieve higher
throughput than Zyzzyva. Indeed, even though MultiP has higher
communication cost than the single phase of Zyzzyva, the relative
increase in parallelism is able to offset this cost, making MultiP
faster.
For HotStuff the limited throughput is in correspondence with
the reasons stated in the previous section. However, as HotStuff
has linear communication complexity (in our design), it scales bet-
ter than consensus protocols such as Pbft that have a quadratic
complexity.
Similar arguments hold for the latency incurred by the clients
of different protocols. Note that by giving Pbft as an input to
ourMultiBFT paradigm, we are able to ensure that Pbft, which
incurred highest latency among all the protocol, now incurs the
least latency asMultiP.
7.5 Impact of Failures
We now evaluate the performance of our protocols under failures.
For these experiments, we require clients and replicas to timeout
after 15s and 10s, respectively, if they are unable to receive any
required messages. As finding the right timeout value is hard and
system-dependent [52], we chose these small constant values.
7.5.1 Attack on One Replica. Figure 11a presents the system
throughput as function of the number of replicas on the failure of a
non-primary replica. Such a failure could be due to one of the two
reasons: (i) the replica crashed, or (ii) one of the primaries acted
malicious and did not send requests to this replica (replica in dark).
In the former case, we assume the replica did not recover until
the end of the experiment, while in the latter case, we assume the
replica continuously requests view-change, but is never successful.
It is evident from the figure that the system throughput did not
change for protocols likeMultiP, Pbft and HotStuff. For these
protocols, a single failure does not impact their respective designs.
On the contrary, a single failure may help these protocols to achieve
higher throughput, as message contention is reduced, especially
for protocols like Pbft andMultiP which have a quadratic com-
munication complexity. However, there is a significant decrease in
throughput for both Zyzzyva andMultiZ.
This reduction can be attributed to Zyzzyva’s choice to optimize
for the best-case situation. For optimal performance, Zyzzyva re-
quires that all n replicas are non-faulty. In Zyzzyva, a client waits
for all n replicas to send an identical response before marking the
request as complete. If this does not happen, then the client will
eventually timeout and enter a recovery mode [35]. This timeout
period causes a sharp decrease in Zyzzyva’s throughput when fail-
ures happen, as the client is idle waiting for the timeout. Although
we allow millions of clients, ultimately all of them start to time-
out. Prior works [14, 15] have similarly observed that Zyzzyva’s
throughput plummets to zero under failures.
As MultiZ inherits Zyzzyva’s design, it also observes a similar
reduction in its throughput. Although it has more parallelism, this
parallelism cannot eliminate an artifact of the underlying consensus
protocol like Zyzzyva, which depends on its clients for ordering
the transactions.
7.5.2 Attack on f Replicas. Figure 11b illustrates an extensive
attack, where a primary replica attempts to affect f non-faulty
replicas. This could be a result of f replicas crashing at the same
time, or malicious primaries not sending the correct request to f
replicas (replicas in dark). In this situation, these non-faulty replicas
timeout and call for primary replacement, but they do not succeed
as they require at least f + 1 replicas to support their cause. Note
that from the perspective of the remaining non-faulty replicas it is
impossible to determine if these f replicas, requesting for a view-
change, are actually saying the truth, as the system can have up to
f byzantine—malicious—replicas.
It is visible from this figure that the system throughput decreases
when there are f failures. This is a straightforward consequence
from the fact that the system is handling the maximum number
of failures. In MultiP (or Pbft), each instance (or replica) needs
exactly n − f Commit messages from the remaining replicas, and,
hence, has to wait for even the slowest remaining replica. Similarly,
primaries inHotStuff need exactlyn− f messages to start the next
phase. Hence the replicas have to wait for all operating replicas,
including the slowest replica, whereas without failures they only
have to wait for the fastest n− f replicas. ForMultiZ and Zyzzyva,
arguments similar to the ones stated in previous section hold.
7.5.3 Collusion Attack. We now illustrate a form of collusion
attack which can easily affect any parallel protocol and can cause a
subsequent decrease in their throughput if not handled correctly.
In Figure 12, we run consensus among 32 replicas and allow one of
the 11 primaries (total 11 instances) to act malicious. This primary
prevents one replica from replicating a request (say transaction 397).
Hence, this replica waits 10s before requesting a view-change. At
the same time, all f byzantine replicas claim that at least one non-
faulty primary is malicious and transmit view-change messages to
remove this primary. Hence, at each replica, the coordinator-thread
receives f + 1 view-change messages from distinct replicas.
Each coordinator-thread waits some more time (5s) to reach a
guarantee that this is a form of collusion attack. We are employ-
ing ourMultiBFT paradigm’s optimistic recovery mechanism (see
Suyash Gupta, Jelle Hellings, and Mohammad Sadoghi
4 8 16 32 46
Number of Replicas
0
50
100
150
200
250
T
hr
ou
gh
pu
t (
K
T
xn
s/
s)
MULTIZ
MULTIP
PBFT
ZYZ
HS
(a) Failure of 1 replica.
4 8 16 32 46
Number of Replicas
0
50
100
150
200
250
T
hr
ou
gh
pu
t (
K
T
xn
s/
s)
MULTIZ
MULTIP
PBFT
ZYZ
HS
(b) Failure of f replicas.
Figure 11: System throughput under failure as a function of the number of replicas with 100 requests/batch. We allow at most
3f replicas to be active at any time during the consensus.
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Figure 12: A collusion attack by malicious replicas on a sys-
temwith 32 replicas. Here, a malicious primary prevents the
0-th instance of non-faulty replica 12, to replicate a request,
which causes this replica to timeout. All the malicious repli-
cas blame multiple non-faulty primaries as malicious. This
leads to f + 1 view-change messages from distinct replicas
and triggers state-exchange through unification.
Section 3.4.3). Hence, after detecting collusion, replicas exchanges
contracts and recover. The size of these contracts exchanged in
our setup is around 175KB. After recovery, the affected replica
starts working again. This attack is an example of a false alarm
in which the malicious replicas are trying to remove a good pri-
mary. In single-primary protocols, this attack cannot happen, but
parallel protocols such as MultiBFT need to address this attack.
Indeed, under this attack, any parallelized protocol which employs
a simple Pbft-style view-change protocol will have virtually zero
throughput.
As all the instances are continuously replicating requests for a
majority of the non-faulty replicas, our MultiP protocol continues
achieving high throughput despite the attack.MultiZ faces a single
replica failure and, hence, as before sees its throughput plummet.
8 RELATEDWORK
Consensus has been widely studied by the distributed computing
community.We restrict ourselves to research addressing some of the
issues addressed byMultiBFT. First, we notice that many primary-
backup crash-fault tolerant consensus protocols exists (e.g. [38, 43,
51, 52, 66]). Although we designed our MultiBFT paradigm for
byzantine failures, it can easily incorporate crash-fault tolerant
protocols.
Traditional BFT protocols. The practical interest in BFT con-
sensus [8, 9, 44] started with the three-phase PBFT protocol [10–
12], after which many protocols that try to improve on PBFT have
been proposed (e.g. [33, 36, 37, 47, 71, 73]). Most of these proto-
cols have presented optimizations to Pbft, without addressing the
issues associated with dedicated primaries. Other attempts to im-
prove throughput of a BFT consensus can be grouped under three
heads: (i) quorum-based, (ii) speculative execution, and (iii) trusted
components.Quorum-based approaches [1, 18, 41, 45, 61] reduce
communication to achieve consensus by reducing resilience to fail-
ures. However, either they cannot handle conflicting operations or
require non-byzantine components. Speculative execution-based
approaches [22, 30, 35, 59] provide good throughput in case of
no-failures, but depend on clients. This causes a severe drop in
their throughput with even one failure.Trusted component-based
approaches [6, 13, 17, 32, 68] reduce the cost of BFT consensus
through the use of a non-malicious component that guarantees suc-
cessful ordering. Most of these protocols follow a primary-backup
design and provide Requirements R1 to R4. Hence, these protocols
can be combined with ourMultiBFT paradigm.
Sharding. Several works [19, 24, 39, 42, 70, 75] employ sharding
to partition data stored at a replica. The key advantage of adopting
the principle of sharding is that each shard can manage its own set
of client requests. This helps to parallelize consensus if a request
requires access to only one shard of data. If the transaction requires
access to several shards, then a sharding-based design faces very low
throughputs [19]. Note that the design of ourMultiBFT paradigm is
orthogonal to these approaches. Within each shard, these sharding
approaches often employ a primary-backup protocol such as Pbft.
Hence, ourMultiBFT paradigm can be used inside each shard to
help increase throughput.
Similar to sharding-based designs, there are works which use
directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) instead of (block)chains. [3, 7, 40, 62,
63]. DAG-based consensus protocols also assume that a small set of
replicas will work independently, and will replicate their own set of
requests. Some of these approaches use a primary-backup approach,
which raises another opportunity for ourMultiBFT paradigm.
Other multiple-primary designs. Prior to our MultiBFT par-
adigm, several other works proposed designs in which multiple
replicas can be primary [4, 23, 39, 64]. None of these designs provide
the continuous-ordering property of MultiBFT, however, and lack
throughput under attacks. Indeed, these protocols do not present
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how to detect and resolve collusion attacks from multiple primaries.
E.g., a recent work, MirBFT [64], attempts replacing malicious pri-
maries using the view-change protocol of Pbft. As Pbft requires
only f + 1 replicas to trigger a view change, this protocol would
easily fail in the false alarm trap that we depicted in Section 7.5.3
(Figure 12). Moreover, the authors show in their paper that MirBFT
protocol attains virtually zero throughput under such attacks. Our
MultiBFT paradigm, on the other hand, can handle such attacks
and maintains its high throughput in all cases.
9 CONCLUSIONS
We presentMultiBFT, a new paradigm for the design of efficient
primary-backup BFT consensus protocols. MultiBFT improves
existing BFT protocols by enabling them to continuously order
client-transactions, this by introducing parallelism in their design.
We show that the resulting parallelized BFT protocols are safe and
live, attain up to 2× higher throughput, and have lower latency
than their original non-parallelized counterparts.
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